Tuesday, July 12, 2011

Not for the faint of heart: my grad-school paper on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East..

               

A Minor-League Exercise in Preventative Diplomacy:
The Kennedy Administration’s Use of the Civil War in Yemen

                North Yemen’s[1] civil war in the 1960s dragged on from 1962 until 1970.  Yet, for all the destructive impact on the lives of the Yemeni people and all their goals and aspirations represented in the fight, in the eyes of the world Yemen’s civil war was never about Yemen.  It was about Nasser and the House of Saud, Arab progressives against Arab conservatives.  It was about colonialism (vis-à-vis the British in bordering Aden), imperialism, and the last gasp of Nasserist pan-Arabism.  It was about Kennedy’s New Frontier, a chance for the United States to prove that it was turning over its imperialist leaf to a new, more progressive one, and that it could do so while still hanging onto its oil-rich, conservative friends.  It was, as everything was in the 1960s, about communism and capitalism, about East versus West.  It was many things, but never about Yemen itself.  As inevitably happens with foreign policy, volatile situations affecting real people with real lives and families become little more than chess pieces in the diplomatic game.  Such was the case with Yemen.

                Perhaps it is ironic to now note that the topic to be discussed here is not the impact of Yemen’s war on the Yemenis.  Rather, it is how their lives at the outbreak of Yemen’s civil war were used by the United States in the game of foreign policy.  The role of the United States in Yemen’s civil war is often overlooked, and perhaps rightfully so.  With the Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam and Israeli-Arab relations taking the 1960s headlines and (in Vietnam’s case) the troop deployments, a civil war in a tiny Arab country on the Arabian Peninsula did not seem that important, even if it involved bigger fish like Saudi Arabia and Egypt.  Outside of a short, token military deployment on the Saudi Arabia/Yemen border and a brief incident in Yemen in 1967, American lives were never at risk.  With little at stake in regards to American lives and American money, it is no surprise that Lyndon Johnson, U.S. president for the majority of the war in Yemen, saw fit in his autobiography to mention it only one time, a passing reference to Nasser “sending troops into Yemen.”[2]  Warren Cohen wrote of the Johnson administration that they “may not have known how to get out of Vietnam, but they knew better than to involve the United States in Yemeni affairs.”[3] 
                As a matter of comparison, it is certainly true that U.S. involvement in Yemen was limited, especially during the Johnson years.  However during the Kennedy administration, in terms of time, prestige and possible implications, the U.S. had a substantial investment in Yemen’s conflict.  The irony of “non-involvement” for the United States was that it often took strenuous diplomatic effort behind the scenes in order to stay publically uninvolved.  Even if Johnson did not think much about Yemen, Kennedy and his Department of State, Ambassadors to the Middle East, and National Security Council kept a close eye on Yemen’s civil war, and saw in it an opportunity for the United States to take a small step towards increased involvement in inter-Arab affairs.  To look at Yemen’s civil war through the eyes of the United States government during the Kennedy administration is to see that the U.S. was considerably involved, not with the actual direct conflict in Yemen, but rather with the implications and outside forces involved in the conflict. 
                Until 1962, the United States had very little interest in Yemeni affairs.  From 1948 until 1962, Yemen was ruled by Imam Ahmed, a Zaydi of the ruling Hamid-al-Din family that had gained international recognition of an independent North Yemen kingdom in the 1920s.  The Zaydis, a Shia sect referred to by some as the “Protestants of Islam” were one of two main religious factions in Yemen.[4]  They tended to be located in the northern highlands of Yemen, and formed the majority of Yemen’s population.  In theory, the Zaydi Imam had authority in both religious and secular affairs, and was supported by the ulama.  In practice, the Imam in Yemen gained his support from oaths of loyalty given to him by many of the Zaydi tribes which functioned for the most part with local autonomy.  The minority religious faction in Yemen was the Shafi’i Sunnis, located mainly along the coast in the south.[5]  Ahmed had an absolutist regime and his control of Yemen was tenuous at best throughout the 1950s.  To the West and to the Arab nationalists Ahmed was seen as backward and oppressive, out of touch with modern times.  A base of Shafi’I merchants and intellectuals and Zaydi military officers challenged his authority throughout the 1950s, seeking to bring about reforms.[6]  Ahmed appeased some of his reform-minded constituents by signing a mutual defense pact with Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt in 1956, and then forming a loose alliance with the United Arab Republic in 1958 called the United Arab States.  In the United States, the Eisenhower administration, though wary of Nasser’s connection to communism and his anti-imperialists rhetoric, thought little of Yemen and looked at the formation of the U.A.S. with “indifference.”[7]
                The beginning of the United States’ increased interest in Yemen was precipitated by the election of John F. Kennedy in 1960, and his desire to develop a new policy towards the progressive third world states.  Since Nasser was the champion of Arab progressivism, winning him over was the key to any progress in Middle Eastern foreign policy. Kennedy was aware that Nasser tended to side more often with the East than with the West.  However, he also realized that Nasser was certainly no hard-line communist, and tended to use Soviet support for his own purposes.[8]  Thus, the Kennedy administration set out to “push the pendulum of U.S.-U.A.R. relations more in our direction.”[9]
                As the United States worked behind the scenes to better their relationship with Nasser, Imam Ahmed was publically accomplishing the opposite.  In December of 1961, Imam Ahmed exercised his role as a religious leader and published a poem critical of the socialist ideology embraced by Nasser.  Ahmed’s poem criticized “innovations prohibited by Islam…such as taking away the property of the people, and the things they have rightfully earned, on the pretext of nationalization and of equalization.”[10]  In response, Nasser ended the short-lived U.A.S. federation.  The Yemen/Egypt break happened shortly after Syria had departed from the United Arab Republic, leaving Egypt alone in the U.A.R.  As a result, Nasser, the champion of pan-Arabism, entered 1962 with a damaged reputation and in need of something to rebuild his image and prestige.  For the United States government, little thought was given at first to Yemen’s break from Egypt.  Instead its main focus was to build on the positive response that their initial overtures to Nasser had received. 
                Given Nasser’s incendiary rhetoric and his reputation as a communist-sympathizing, anti-Western leader, Kennedy knew he would have to move carefully to avoid negative political fallout that would come with too overt an attempt to court Nasser.  Furthermore, Nasser’s speeches and radio broadcasts coming from Cairo encouraged Arab people in countries such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan to overthrow their outdated monarchs and embrace Nasser’s Arab nationalist vision.  King Saud and King Hussein of Jordan were understandably upset with Nasser, and did not look favorably upon the new U.S. policy of support for their nemesis.  Despite Saudi and Jordanian disapproval, the Kennedy administration pushed on with its plan to “create a vested interest on [Nasser’s] part” to form better U.S./U.A.R. relations, which would then “inhibit him” from upsetting the new relationship.[11]  If the United States could get Nasser to accept a carrot, then they could use the carrot to lead him where they wished, or at least prod him in a more U.S.-friendly direction.  Yet, they had to do so in a subtle, evolutionary way.  An initial plan to invite Nasser to visit the United States in 1962 as the “culmination” of a four step process toward improved relations was vetoed by Kennedy, who was worried about the political implications.[12]  Instead, Kennedy settled on a less public three-year agreement for a PL-480 aid program for Egypt, a program which “made surplus American grain available to developing countries at nominal cost”[13]  By June of 1962, Nasser had written a letter to Kennedy which expressed “sincere gratitude,” a development that was, according to William Brubeck, “unique in the history of U.S.-U.A.R. relations.”[14]  A month later, on July 28th, a memo from the Department of State to the National Security Council was forward to Kennedy with the comment that U.S.-U.A.R. relations “are now ‘good’ rather than normal.’”[15]  It was the high point of U.S.-U.A.R. relations.
                In the dynamic and ever-changing world of diplomacy it is impossible to predict what will happen next, although not for lack of trying.  The U.S. may have envisioned that a civil war would break out in Yemen, but they certainly would not have expected it to be the impetus that brought them into the middle of an inter-Arab conflict.  Even if the specifics of the situation might not have been imagined, by January of 1962, there was an indication that the new U.S. policy towards Nasser might place them in a predicament with their conservative Arab friends.  During a meeting between Saud and Kennedy in Palm Beach, Saud expressed concern about the increasing U.S. economic aid for the U.A.R.[16]  By May those fears increased, and reports came from representatives of King Hussein and King Saud that they “found it impossible to understand why the U.S…was helping the man who was seeking to destroy their governments.”[17]  Saud’s representatives were more specific: they felt that an increase in aid for the U.A.R. “implies a lessening of U.S. concern for Saudi Arabia.”[18]  The line between Nasser and Saud was already drawn by early 1962, and Kennedy’s foreign policy placed the United States right in the middle.  The outbreak of war in Yemen only increased the pressure from both sides on the Kennedy administration.
                On September 13, 1962, the previously-ignored country of Yemen suddenly became important when an intelligence report sent to the National Security Council indicated that a “Pro-Nasser army coup plot in the Yemen” was imminent.[19]  One week later, Imam Ahmed died before the coup could be carried out.  Ahmed’s son, the Crown Prince Muhammad al-Badr, assumed control and tried to gather support by announcing reforms.  His attempts to consolidate power proved futile.  Six days later, on September 26th, the coup that had been planned for his father was instead carried out against al-Badr with an attack on his palace.  Published reports mistakenly indicated that al-Badr had been killed in the attack, which caused Prince Hassan, al-Badr’s uncle and Yemen’s representative to the United Nations, to fly back to Yemen in order to assume control in place of his nephew. [20]  Meanwhile, U.S. representatives held separate meetings on September 27th with Egypt’s Vice President Anwar Sedat and Saudi Arabia’s Prince Faisal[21] to assess the situation.  Faisal’s assessment in Yemen was that Hassan was the “only leader left who could command support in Yemen.”[22]  Not surprisingly, Sedat took the opposite position.  He told Ambassador John Badeau that it would be a “grave mistake” to back Hassan because “most of Yemen’s intelligentsia supported the coup and the republic.”[23] 
                  Regardless of the United States’ desire to be involved in Yemen, the coup and the establishment of a republic in Yemen meant that the United States would have a role to play.  The problem for the United States, in light of their newfound guarded support of Nasser, was that evidence seemed to indicate that the U.A.R. had directly supported the revolution.  Although at the time the extent of U.A.R. interference was disputed, in 1990 historian F. Gregory Gause noted that “there is now no disputing the fact of Egyptian foreknowledge of and support for the coup which overthrew Imam al-Badr.”[24]  Furthermore, Cairo’s propaganda machine began radio broadcasts after Ahmed’s death which hinted that the revolution would not stop in Yemen, and that “other Arab Kings were just as dead as Ahmed, but not yet buried.”[25]  The U.S. had made a concerted effort to improve relations with Nasser.  They were committed to staying the course, and did not want to give up the gains they had so far made.  Yet, at the same time, they could not turn their backs on Saudi Arabia, a country which had valuable oil resources and which had proven to be a friend of the United States.  They were in a conundrum, and from the outset the Kennedy administration decided that the way to fix the Yemen problem was not to deal with Yemen directly.  Instead, as Secretary of State Dean Rusk suggested, the “heart of the problem is not in Sanaa [Yemen’s capital] but in Cairo.”[26]  Since the United States was the only power in the West with any hope of influencing the U.A.R., a strategy was taken to use the newfound “good” relationship with Cairo in order to achieve an outcome in Yemen that protected U.S. interests and secured stability in the Middle East. 
                In October it was revealed that Imam al-Badr had not died, as early reports had indicated.  Instead, al-Badr was alive and became, as Robert Stookey wrote, the “indispensible symbol of the legitimacy of the royalist regime.”[27]  However, even if Yemen’s former leader was alive, most U.S. officials considered the Imamate’s rule in Yemen “one of the most backwards in the world.”[28]  In light of the New Frontier policy of winning over progressive countries, the U.S. did not want to be seen as backing an oppressive, reactionary regime.  Perhaps in recognition of that fact, the U.A.R. immediately put pressure on Kennedy to recognize the legitimacy of the Yemen Arab Republic (Y.A.R.).   At the same time, Faisal in Saudi Arabia planned to support a counter-offensive led by al-Badr, and he too wanted U.S. support.  To further complicate matters, one of the last vestiges of British colonialism in the Middle East, the protectorate of Aden, was located on the southern border of Yemen.  Britain and Nasser still had bad blood from the Suez Crisis of 1956, and Britain was going to be a tough sell on giving Nasser what he wanted in Yemen: namely, recognition of the Y.A.R.  The United States was stuck between Yemen’s old regime - existing as a loose coalition of counter-revolutionaries backed by the Saudis and the UK and generally referred to as the “royalists,” - and the new republic, led by Abdullah al-Sallal, Yemen’s military, and the strong guiding hand of Nasser.  The question of which regime to recognize became an important card for the U.S. to play in the game of foreign policy.
                Initially, discussion in the Kennedy administration about recognition of the Y.A.R. was a matter of “when” rather than “if.”  True to its strategy throughout the course of Yemen’s conflict, the U.S. rarely consulted the actual Yemeni combatants, and when they did, it was only a matter of formalities as if the U.S. was doing the Yemeni representation a favor.  Instead, the main issue for the U.S. was how to use recognition as a tool to reach desirable political ends.  The actual violence in Yemen between royalists and republicans was of little interest to Secretary of State Dean Rusk; he dismissed the situation in Yemen as “less crucial” than the “external interests” involved in Yemen’s crisis.  Instead, Rusk saw in Yemen a “unique and probably short-lived opportunity” for the United States.  Rusk wrote, “Hitherto we have tried to keep out of inter-Arab affairs but now we have legitimate and understandable need to step in and stay in.”[29]  By staying out of Yemen in a direct way, the United States could use its position of “non-involvement” in order to use the crisis as a way to achieve foreign policy goals.  There was, of course, the argument that giving recognition to the Y.A.R. would simply encourage Nasser to plan similar interventions elsewhere in the Middle East.  In order to combat that possibility, Robert Komer (member of the National Security Council) suggested that the U.S. “hold [recognition] out as one means of getting UAR and YAR to provide reassurances to Saud, UK, and Jordan.”[30]
                In early October, it seemed that U.S. recognition of the Y.A.R. was imminent.  Then, the Cuban Missile Crisis changed the proposed timeline and put the issue of Yemen on the backburner.  By November, the long-delayed plans for recognition were restarted.  A tentative plan called for recognition of the Y.A.R. regime on November 15th, to be balanced with a show of support for Faisal in the form of dispatching a U.S. Destroyer to Saudi Arabia and publishing a letter from Kennedy to Faisal.[31]  The plan’s supporters suggested that recognition would be a “catalytic action which would lead to normalization of the Yemeni situation.”[32]  However, the token show of support did not satisfy Faisal, particularly because in early November there were reports that the U.A.R. had bombed Saudi territory.[33]  Kennedy could not extend recognition so soon to a regime with close ties to a country that had recently committed hostile actions against an ally of the United States.  Thus, the “catalytic action” that was supposed to normalize Yemen had to wait until December.  It should be noted that the “normalization” envisioned by the United States meant simply that Yemen’s violence would be contained within Yemen itself and would not spill into Aden or Saudi Arabia.  The U.S. was perfectly content to let the Yemenis fight it out themselves, so long as the countries important to U.S. interests stayed out of the conflict. 
                Saudi Arabia and Jordan were not pleased with the U.S. plan to recognize the Y.A.R.  They saw it as a show of support for Nasser, and they wanted a complete withdrawal of U.A.R. troops from Yemen before recognition of the new republic be given.  However, the Kennedy administration remained “convinced that our action is in [Saudi Arabia’s] overall interest as well as our own” and further believed that a failure on the part of the U.S. to recognize the new regime “will lead to escalation of the conflict endangering the stability of the whole Arabian Peninsula.”[34]  The U.S. decided to go forward with a plan that called for the Y.A.R. and U.A.R. to release public statements that would (theoretically) soothe the ears of Saudi Arabia, Britain and Jordan.  The Y.A.R.’s statement promised not to get involved with Aden or other territories, and the U.A.R.’s statement promised the removal of its troops so long as Saudi Arabia stopped supporting the royalists.  Upon the December 19th, 1962 release of the statements, the U.S. State Department issued a press release that offered U.S. recognition of the Yemen Arab Republic.[35]  As New York Times reporter Dana Schmidt wrote at the time, “The day was carried by the New Frontier element.”[36]
                In hindsight, it seems naïve of the U.S. to think that recognizing the new Yemen Arab Republic would be the catalyst for the Saudis and Egyptians to stand down.  The U.A.R. was certainly pleased, but the only items the U.S. got in return were vague, non-binding and hardly-enforceable public promises of peace from the U.A.R. and Y.A.R.  Not surprisingly, Saudi Arabia and Jordan continued to funnel money and weapons to the royalists, and there was little hope of getting Nasser to leave Yemen when there was still a possibility that the new Republic could be overthrown.  He had committed himself and his dwindling prestige to the establishment and continuation of the Y.A.R.  Thus, recognition of the Y.A.R. proved to be but the start of a long, painful process in which the United States attempted to use its position of “non-involvement” to mediate between Saudi Arabia and the U.A.R. in order to achieve disengagement. 
                Perhaps the first public blow for the U.S. in its new venture into inter-Arab affairs came on December 30, 1962, when the U.A.R. crossed into Saudi Arabia and bombed areas which they believed were royalist havens.  Rusk understood the seriousness of the raids, noting that they raised questions “as to the validity of our policy toward the U.A.R.”  In light of the balancing act between support of Nasserist progressivism and support of the conservative regimes, Rusk believed the U.S. needed to make “overt gestures of support for Saudi Arabia” in order to let Nasser know that recognition of the Y.A.R. was not a blank check of U.S. support for its military actions in Yemen.[37]  Yet, at the same time the U.S. could not “serve as a shield” allowing Saudi Arabia to “supply weapons and ammunitions to Royalists.”[38]  After all, the U.S. recognized the legitimacy of the Republic, and Saudi Arabia aided the opposition to the legitimate government of Yemen.  The U.S. position of non-involvement thus led them into greater involvement behind the scenes, as they attempted to balance the scales so that they could stay squarely in the middle.
                In the aftermath of the U.A.R’s attacks on Saudi Arabia and Saudi Arabia’s continued support of the royalists, U.S. officials realized that they would need to take further steps to bring the conflict to a peaceful conclusion.  In the interest of scoring a point for the New Frontier, the U.S. had placed its reputation on the line in Yemen and could not simply walk away from it all.  Everywhere in early 1963 U.S. officials sounded ominous warnings of the dangers ahead.  McGeorge Bundy sounded like a concerned teacher speaking of his pupils and wrote, “Unless both Nasser and Faisal stop misbehaving we may find ourselves in the middle of something more than a civil war in Yemen.”[39]  Rusk suggested that Kennedy send a letter to Nasser (a suggestion Kennedy followed) because he detected a “reversal in previously improving contact” with the U.A.R.[40]  Kennedy himself tried to sway Britain towards recognizing Yemen’s new regime and wrote to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, "If Nasser escalates and the Saudis then hit back with mercenary pilots, we may have the Near East aflame."[41]  Meanwhile, Komer, fresh off of a meeting with a concerned oil executive (Kermit Roosevelt) who questioned U.S. policy towards Nasser, wrote, “Nasser has tiger by the tail, and can't afford to let go. Instead he's more likely to up the ante again,” and concluded, “this peanut war will be with us a long time yet.”[42] 
                Despite the setbacks, foreign policy must always be in motion, thinking of the possibilities of a perfect world in which plans go exactly as they should.  In January 1963, the U.S. settled on a new course of action, one which utilized the United Nations as a “face-saving device” for the Americans.[43]  With the United Nations taking the lead on disengagement talks, the U.S. would be able to shield itself from criticism that it was unable to exert its prestige in order to secure a peaceful settlement in Yemen.  The U.S. also realized it needed to show Nasser that it was serious about de-escalation and that if the U.A.R. continued to bomb the Saudis, it would follow-through on promises to protect Saudi Arabia’s security.  To that end, Kennedy decided to go ahead with a plan for a token military deployment of an air squadron to Saudi Arabia at a to-be-determined date. [44]  The Joint Chiefs of Staff were reluctant to send a miniscule air squadron without a clear goal in mind.  There was the possibility of direct conflict with the U.A.R. if the small show of force did not cause the Egyptians to cease the air raids.  However, Komer’s argument that “we had already given Nasser certain warnings; the need was to make them credible,” swayed Kennedy.[45]  He believed that the token deployment would reassure Saudi Arabia and stand as a firm reprimand and warning to Nasser that he must follow through on his promises to stop his forays into Saudi territory. 
                In late February Kennedy sent Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, armed with the promise of U.S. military support, on a special mission to Saudi Arabia to present a new U.S. plan for U.A.R.-Saudi disengagement in Yemen.  The Americans’ “face-saving device” also began its part of the play when they sent Ralph Bunche to meet with the U.A.R., Yemen, and Saudi Arabia on a preliminary, fact-finding mission.  Bunche met with Nasser, but returned to the United States before meeting with Faisal because Faisal was upset that Bunche would not meet with the Saudi-backed royalists in Yemen.  Since Bunche could not meet with Faisal, on March 10th Bunker and Bunche met in New York City to discuss their respective diplomatic trips and to coordinate their next efforts.  As the two discussed the future, the Kennedy administration worked furiously behind the scenes to keep in effect the fragile on-paper cease-fire between the U.A.R. and Saudi Arabia.[46] 
                With Dr. Bunche only half-done with his preliminary U.N. mission, the eyes of the world still saw the U.S. as the great power responsible for any escalation that might happen in Yemen.  The U.S. could not simply sit back while the U.N. dragged its feet on disengagement.  As such, Komer suggested to Kennedy, “We'd better send Bunker out again to continue working out mutual disengagement preliminaries. Then perhaps UN could take over.”[47]  In his initial trip to Saudi Arabia, Bunker had convinced Faisal to agree in principle to an eight-point proposal for disengagement.  Bunker took those eight proposals on a second trip, this time to Cairo (although in Cairo they would be “seven-point proposals” because the fact that Saudi Arabia would receive token military deployment was not deemed wise to reveal to Nasser at the time).[48]  Throughout March and early April, Bunker went back and forth from Saudi Arabia to Egypt, working out the details of a mutual disengagement plan.  There were numerous revisions to the seven points before a final version was finally agreed upon by both sides on April 9th.  The final version called for Saudi Arabia to stop supplying the royalists, at which point the U.A.R. would begin phased withdrawals of its troops.  Also, the U.A.R. agreed to stop attacks on Saudi territory, and a de-militarized zone (DMZ) was formed on the Saudi-Yemen border on which impartial U.N. observers would be stationed.  Both countries agreed to cooperate with the U.N.’s to-be-appointed mediator, and the U.A.R. agreed to “influence” the Y.A.R. to stop "inflammatory speeches" aimed at the Saudis and the British.[49]
                The U.S. presented Bunker’s arrangement to U.N. Secretary General U Thant on April 12th and received his approval, opening the door for the U.N. to take control of the situation.[50]  All that was left for the U.S. was to deploy its air squadron to Saudi Arabia, and hope that the U.A.R. was not foolish enough to attack.  Once again, however, unplanned events struck and threatened to derail the entire process.  First, the planned U.N. observation team (it would become known as the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission, UNYOM) was held up by the Soviet Union, which refused to provide U.N. funding for the mission.  A month after U Thant had tentatively approved the plan the UNYOM mission sill had not begun, making U.S. officials nervous.  On May 24th, Komer noted, “If our Yemen effort collapses, it will add mightily to our woes in the Middle East.”[51]  Along with the problem of Yemen, in late April the U.A.R., Syria and Iraq formed a tripartite union and declared a war of destruction against Israel.  That action only made the already sizeable anti-Nasser voices in the U.S. louder.  Meanwhile, the Kennedy administration was trying to use whatever leverage it had gained from its improved relationship with Nasser to get him to stop bombing Saudi Arabia so that the disengagement process would not collapse.  On June 8th, Faisal sent an urgent message to Kennedy and requested that the promised air squadron, a mission Kennedy dubbed “Hard Surface,” be sent immediately in the wake of recent U.A.R. bombings.[52]  Rusk warned Kennedy that the situation was serious: unless Faisal received the promised deployment soon, “there is real danger that already seriously deteriorating United States-Saudi relations will reach a dangerous low point.”[53] 
                The good news in the midst of Faisal’s urgent June plea was that the United Nations had finally secured the funding needed for its mission to Yemen.  On June 12th, the first members of the 200-person team were expected to arrive in Yemen and proceed to the DMZ on the Saudi-Yemen border.[54]  However, the end of UNYOM’s delay was replaced by another delay, this time with Operation Hard Surface.  On June 10th, the New York Times published a story which, citing the authority of Brooklyn Congressman Emanuel Celler, claimed that “United States servicemen of the Jewish faith have been serving in Saudi Arabia for several weeks, despite strong objections in the past by the Saudi government to their presence.”[55]  For years, the U.S. had leased an air force base in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.  Part of the lease agreement “bound the United States not to send any person objectionable to the Saudi government,” which meant, in practice, that Jewish servicemen did not go to Dhahran.  The lease, and with it the lease’s terms, expired in 1962 even though the U.S. maintained a minimal military presence in the country.[56]  The New York Times article seemed innocent enough in the U.S. but caused a stir in Saudi Arabia.  Faisal ordered radio broadcasts to repudiate the claim that Jews were being allowed to enter Saudi Arabia.  He angrily requested that the United States “denounce” Congressman Celler’s report, and as a result, Operation Hard Surface was put on hold until the situation could be sorted out.  Finally, on June 27th an agreement was worked out.  A press conference would be held announcing the commencement of Operation Hard Surface, and a pre-approved question would be asked at the press conference regarding the Jewish controversy.  In response to the planted question, the State Department would assert that Saudi Arabia retained its right to screen visa applicants in whichever way it so desired, and the United States likewise affirmed its own policy of non-discrimination.[57]  Somehow, that vaguely worded non-answer was enough for Faisal, who had to put on a rather extreme anti-Jewish face to the Saudi public, especially with the ever-present Nasserist ideology lurking to claim that Faisal was a Zionist stooge.  With the delay ended, Operation Hard Surface commenced in early July with the sending of eight F-100 D tactical fighters to Saudi Arabia.
                The first half of 1963 had been a blur of activity, as the U.S. scrambled behind the scenes to work out a mutually agreed-upon disengagement plan and prodded the United Nations to take the lead in enforcing the plan.  Along with that process, the U.S. organized and planned the details for the token military deployment in Saudi Arabia and constantly pleaded with both Nasser and Faisal to use diplomatic channels rather than violence to work out their differences.  On July 2nd, Komer looked back on their work and noted, “We are still moving slowly, haltingly, but distinctly toward a successful exercise."[58]  He looked approvingly at what Kennedy told him was “his war” and thought that the objectives of “preventing Yemen’s war from spreading into full-fledged intra-Arab conflict (with risk of overt US/USSR involvement), and protecting our Saudi clients from their own folly while still not compromising our overall UAR policy" had all been achieved.[59]  Indeed, within the State Department it was claimed that largely because of U.S. policy with Nasser (and by extension, Yemen), the “only parallel to U.S. success in [the] Mid East is that of [the] Marshall Plan in Europe.”[60]  The Kennedy administration realized that there were still problems ahead.  For example, Nasser was reportedly using chemical weapons on the royalists in Yemen.  But with so much apparent progress on Yemen (or rather, on U.S. outcomes involving Yemen’s conflict), U.S. officials decided to publically protect their investment in Nasser by side-stepping questions from the press about chemical weapons and instead applying “tough private noises.”[61]  It was time, in the eyes of the Kennedy administration, to plow forward in Yemen.  Next up for the U.S and Komer was a plan “to get the UAR and Saudis together to start talking about a political solution in Yemen."[62]
                The glowing praise for the U.S. enterprise in Yemen was short-lived.  The ineffectiveness of the U.S.-brokered agreement became apparent when the number of U.A.R. troops in Yemen actually increased by the fall of 1963.  When the U.S. asked Nasser about his troop increase, he placed the blame on the Saudis, claiming (against U.S. evidence) that Faisal was still supplying the royalists.  Air raids into Saudi territory continued from time to time, making the Joint Chiefs of Staff nervous about the possibility of direct engagement with Hard Surface, their feeble token deployment.[63]  Yet, even as the parameters of the U.S.-led drawdown collapsed, the Kennedy administration remained committed to the course.  They pressed on to the next phase, which called for secret, informal talks between Faisal and Nasser.  Unfortunately, Faisal repeatedly rebuffed their efforts.[64]  By September 20th, Komer reversed course on his earlier optimism and expressed frustration.  He wrote dismissively that if the State Department didn’t bear down on the Saudis and Egyptians, “this minor league exercise in preventive diplomacy will come apart at the seams.”[65]  Komer also lashed out at the “non-country” of Yemen for making the process of disengagement take so long.  Ultimately, though, Komer still wanted to see his work through until the end.  He correctly noted that the U.S. had expended minimal resources as far as money and material goods were concerned.  As a result, the U.S. needed simply to stay the course with “sustained diplomatic pressure on both Cairo and Jidda, repeated leaning on the UN” and the continuation of Operation Hard Surface.[66]  By October 7th, sensing that the status quo was not yet working, Komer pleaded with Kennedy for a “sharp word from on high” to get people re-focused on Yemen, which “is in danger of coming unstuck”[67]
                The Bunker Agreement would indeed become unstuck, but not for lack of trying on the part of the United States.  Most of the energy expended over Yemen at the State Department in late 1963 involved dogged attempts to keep the crumbling structure of the Bunker Agreement going.  The ineptness of UNYOM in enforcing the agreement was apparent.  Yet every two months when it was set to expire, the U.S. pleaded with Nasser and Faisal to extend funding for the mission for two more months.  The every-other-month campaign for renewal lasted all the way until September 4th, 1964, when UNYOM finally disbanded with precious little in the way of positive results.  A similar process happened with Operation Hard Surface, which was renewed several times until the “miniscule jet fighter force” was quietly redeployed in February, 1964.[68]  Meanwhile, even before Kennedy’s death on November 22nd, signs were clear that the “good” relationship with Nasser form the summer of 1962 was not going to last.  For one, despite the apparent good-will between Nasser and Kennedy expressed in their correspondence, Kennedy failed to convince Nasser to abide by the Bunker Agreement.  Furthermore, the anti-Nasser forces in the U.S. used Nasser’s misbehavior in Yemen to continually apply pressure on the New Frontier element to change its Nasser policy.  On November 7th, 1963, the U.S. Senate passed the Gruening Amendment, which allowed the U.S. to withhold foreign aid (such as the PL-480 grain sent to Egypt) if a foreign aid recipient was deemed to be engaging in aggressive activity against the United States or any country that received aid from the U.S.[69]  The amendment was clearly pinpointed at Nasser, a fact which was not lost on him.  William Joseph Burns noted that a day after hearing of the Gruening Amendment, Nasser’s opinion was that “It now seemed clear that he must go back to 1957” in his relationship with the United States.[70]  The souring relationship was not helped by Lyndon Johnson’s ascension to President.  As Ethan Nadelmann wrote, the Arab world viewed it (rightly or wrongly) “as the principal factor contributing to the deterioration of Arab-American relations.”[71]
                When the good relationship between the U.A.R. and the U.S. collapsed, there was less of a need for the U.S. to exert so much energy in keeping Nasser compliant in Yemen.  The U.S. was never that concerned about Yemen anyway, and only saw the country as a way to advance and protect its Nasser policy.  By 1964, it was well-known that Nasser’s forces were bogged down in Yemen, fighting a costly war that was increasingly unpopular in Egypt.  The U.S. still worked behind the scenes under the Johnson administration to supply advice, to cajole both sides to keep the conflict from escalating, and to protect American interests in the region.  However, the U.S. never made another Bunker-like attempt at securing and then ensuring disengagement in Yemen.  There were a variety of reasons for this.  The obvious reason is that the United States became more focused elsewhere, especially Vietnam.  However, the failure of the U.S. and the U.N. to bring about disengagement also led Faisal and Nasser to take more initiative in the peace-making process.  In September of 1964, they met at a summit in Alexandria, Egypt, and agreed to terms that would bring the Saudi-and-Egypt part of the Yemen conflict to an end.  The agreement at Alexandria, like the Bunker Agreement, was never carried out.  Inevitably, Nasser would increase the troops present in Yemen, an air raid over Saudi Arabia would commence, or Faisal would continue “gun-running” across the Yemen border and the Saudi-Egyptian showdown would be back in force.  Another development over time was the increasing anti-Nasser sentiment in Yemen itself.  Nasser was seen by some in Yemen as the very imperialist he claimed to despise, and many Yemenis sought to end all outside interference in their country and let Yemenis decide their fate.[72]
                In the end, it wasn’t U.S. pressure or Yemeni self-determination that caused Nasser to leave.  Rather, his departure was a consequence of the disastrous Six-Day War in 1967.  By December of that year, most U.A.R. forces were out of Yemen for good.  Interestingly, Nasser’s departure did not lead to a royalist victory.  Instead, the civil war ended with a victory for the Republic.  A constitution was created in 1969, and by 1970 Saudi Arabia recognized the legitimacy of the Yemen Arab Republic.  This was likely due to the creation of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, also known as South Yemen, which emerged from British colonial rule to become a Marxist state with close ties to the Soviet Union.  Faisal realized that the Yemen Arab Republic was less of a threat than South Yemen, and acted accordingly.[73] 
                It seems only fitting that Yemen, site of one of the few conflicts of the last fifty years in which the United States has been credited with showing restraint, has drawn comparisons to both Vietnam and Afghanistan.  Nasser has often been quoted as referring to Yemen as “my Vietnam,” a statement which when read today seems to depict a remarkable sense of self-awareness and resignation.  Yet, that comparison was made as early as February, 1965, when a CIA memo noted that Egypt’s Prime Minister Ali Sabri called Yemen “Egypt’s Vietnam.”  1965 Vietnam was a very different thing than 1973 Vietnam, and perhaps Nasser’s oft-repeated quote shouldn’t necessarily imply that Nasser had the same understanding of Vietnam as those who look back today on the entirety of the Vietnam War with all of its political and social implications.[74]  However, regardless of what Nasser meant with his comparison, it resonates today because of the obvious parallels between two conflicts involving prolonged and unsuccessful military involvement in the civil war of a third world country.  As for Yemen’s similarity to Afghanistan, Robert Burrows wrote that in geographic and socio-cultural structures, “North Yemen and Afghanistan probably resemble each other more than either resembles any other late-developing country.”[75]  Some of the difficulties faced today by the United States in their nation-building project in Afghanistan, such as dealing with religiously-motivated tribal resistance in mountainous regions or failing to extend functional control by the national government over isolated parts of the country, were also faced by Nasser in 1960s Yemen.
                Nasser saw Yemen as an opportunity to spread the gospel of progress and Arab nationalism, and committed himself and his reputation so thoroughly to it that only when his reputation was ruined elsewhere could he finally withdraw.  Saudi Arabia saw in Yemen a chance to fight against the spread of Nasserism on a stage outside of Saudi Arabia itself.  It was much wiser to fund Yemeni foot soldiers fighting a destructive war in a neighboring country.  Meanwhile, the U.S. used Yemen to try to build its reputation as lovers of progress (progress as defined according to the intellectual currents of the day).  The Kennedy administration believed that recognizing the new “progressive” regime of the Yemen Arab Republic would be a nice feather in their cap on their way to being all things to all people, loved (or at least tolerated) by Nasserites and revered (or at least respected) by conservatives.  When recognition did not bring about the intended consequences, the U.S. found itself involved in a game of “minor league preventative diplomacy” that it never intended to play.  Ironically, it was forced to increase its involvement in the peripheries of the Yemeni war in order to save for itself the middle-ground of non-involvement in the Yemeni war itself. 
                In the end, it was the Yemenis themselves who ended the war and created a new government.  By then, of course, the United States had moved onto playing the game of diplomacy (in many) elsewhere(s).  Nearly forty years later, the U.S. finds itself embroiled once again in Yemen, this time because of the War on Terror.  What lessons, if any, can be learned from their last concerted involvement in Yemen?  The situations and context now are so different that perhaps there aren’t any, except the great lesson that foreign policy will never go the way it is planned.  Or perhaps J.B. Kelly, writing of Yemen in 1966, had a lesson of sorts when he wrote, “[The Arabian Peninsula] will go its own way, according to its own lights, and in its own time, and not according to the ideological dictates of those who have constituted themselves the augurs of political progress.”[76]  
                   
                 
               
                     

Notes


                [1] I will use the term “Yemen” throughout the paper in reference to an area that is more appropriately known as “North Yemen.”  The area known as South Yemen was a former British protectorate until 1968, and then had a civil war of its own, eventually establishing a Marxist-led government.  North and South Yemen were united as “Yemen” in 1990, although peace has not been constant since their unification.
                [2] Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 290.
                [3] Warren I Cohen, “Lyndon Baines v. Gamal Abdul Nasser,” in Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy 1963-1968 (Cambridge University Press, 1994), 284.
                [4] Mohammed Ahmad Zabarah, Yemen: Traditionalism vs. Modernity (New York: Praeger, 1982), 5.
                [5] Robert Burrows, “Prelude to Unification: The Yemen Arab Republic, 1962-1990,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 23.4 (Nov. 1991): 484.
                [6] Robert Stookey, Yemen: The Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), 228. 
                [7] Zabarah, 60.
                [8] National Intelligence Estimate, 27 June 1961, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 17: 164-166.
                [9] Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (McGhee), 30 May 1961, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 17: 142-145.
                [10] John Murray, The Yemen: Imams, Rulers and Revolutions (London: Harold Ingrams, 1963), 115; Jay Walz, “Socialism Factor as Cairo Cuts Tie,” New York Times Dec. 28, 1961, 3.
                [11] Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 8 Dec. 1961, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 17: 359-363.
                [12] Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 31 January 1962, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 17: 456-457.
                [13] Douglas Little, “The New Frontier on the Nile: JFK, Nasser, and Arab Nationalism,” The Journal of American History 75.2 (Sept. 1988): 507.
                [14]Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),  25 June 1962, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 17: 755-756.
                [15] Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 28 July 1962, .S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 20-21.
                [16] Memorandum of Conversation, 13 Feb. 1962, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 17: 470-475.
                [17] Telegram from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 23 May 1962, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 17: 674-675.
                [18] Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 4 June 1962, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 17: 706-707.
                [19]  Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk, 13 September 1962, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 91-92.
                [20] “Imam of Yemen Reported Slain In a Coup After a Week on the Throne,” New York Times Sept. 28, 1962, 1.
                [21] Faisal had taken over functional operation in place of the ailing King Saud by this time, although it would take until November of 1964 for Faisal to officially depose Saud.
                [22] Memorandum of conversation, 27 September 1962, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 136-140.
                [23] Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, in New York, 27 Sept. 1962, , U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 141-142.
                [24] F. Gregory Gause III, Saudi-Yemeni Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 59. 
                [25] Murray, 128.
                [26] Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, in New York, 27 Sept. 1962, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 141-142.
                [27] Stookey, 241.
                [28] Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State, 1 Oct. 1962, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 150-151.
                [29] Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic, 13 Oct. 1962, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 178-182.
                [30] Paper by the Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs (Seelye), 17 Oct. 1962, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 182-183.
                [31] Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, 12 Nov. 1962, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 211-218.
                [32] Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk, 13 Nov. 1962, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 220-222.
                [33] Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia, 7  Nov. 1962, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 203-205.
                [34] Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 6 Dec. 1962, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 260-262.
                [35] Editorial Note, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 268-269.
                [36] Dana Adams Schmidt, Yemen: The Unknown War (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), 189.
                [37] Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia, 31 Dec. 1962, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 288-289.
                [38] Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia, 31 Dec. 1962, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 290-291.
                [39] Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor), 11 Jan. 1963, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 303-305.
                [40] Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 26 Jan. 1963, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 326-327.
                [41] Telegram from President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan, 26 Jan. 1963, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 325-325.
                [42] Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 7 Feb. 1963, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18:338-339.
                [43] Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 24 Feb. 1963, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18:358-363.
                [44] Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, 2 Jan. 1963, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 295-298.
                [45] Memorandum for the Record, 25 Feb. 1963, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 363-366.
                [46] Editorial Note, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 392-393.
                [47] Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy, 11 March 1963, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 416-417.
                [48] Ibid.
                [49] Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State, 7 April 1963, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 453-456.
                [50] Editorial Note, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 458-459.
                [51] Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy, 24 May 1963, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 555.
                [52] Telegram From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the Ambassador to Saudi Arabia (Hart), 8 June 1963, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 573-574.
                [53] Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, 12 June 1963, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 577-579.
                [54] Ibid.
                [55] "Saudi Arabia lets Jews in U.S. Units Serve on Her Soil" New York Times June 10, 1963, 4.
                [56] Ibid.
                [57]Editorial Note,  U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 581-583.
                [58] Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy, 2 July 1963, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18:621-622.
                [59] Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy, 12 July 1963, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18:641-42.
                [60] Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia, 23 July 1963, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 656-658.
                [61] Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 15 July 1963, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 642-644.
                [62] Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy, 9 August 1963, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 670.
                [63] Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, 16 August 1963, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 675-680.
                [64] Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia, 26 August 1963, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 688-691.
                [65] Paper by Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff, 20 Sept. 1963, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 710-713.
                [66] Ibid.
                [67] Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy, 7 Oct. 1963, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 725-726.
                [68] Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 6 Sept. 1963, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 695-697.
                [69] Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Senator J. William Fulbright, 11 Nov. 1963, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994) 18: 775-776.
                [70] William Joseph Burns, Economic Aid and American Policy Toward Egypt, 1955-1981 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 146.
                [71] Ethan Nadelmann, “Setting the Stage: American Policy Toward the Middle East, 1961-1966,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 14.4 (Nov. 1982): 445.
                [72] Edgar O’Ballance, The War in the Yemen (Hamden: Archon Books, 1971), 121-189.
                [73] O’Ballance, 200-202.
                [74] Special Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, 18 Feb. 1965, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968 (Washington, 2000) 11: 360.
                [75] Burrows, 483.
                [76] J.B. Kelly, “The Future in Arabia,” International Affairs 42.4 (Oct. 1966): 619.




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